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Abstract
By analysing probabilistic foundations of quantum theory we un-
derstood that the so called quantum calculus of probabilities (includ-
ing Born’s rule) is not the main distinguishing feature of “quantum”.
This calculus is just a special variant of a contextual probabilistic cal-
culus. In particular, we analysed the EPR-Bohm-Bell approach by
using contextual probabilistic models (e.g., the frequency von Mises
model). It is demonstrated that the EPR-Bohm-Bell consideration are
not so much about “quantum”, but they are merely about contextual.
Our conjecture is that the “fundamental quantum element” is the
Schro¨dinger evolution describing the very special dependence of prob-
abilities on contexts. The main quantum mystery is neither the prob-
ability calculus in a Hilbert space nor the nonncommutative (Heisen-
berg) representation of physical observables, but the Schro¨dinger evo-
lution of contextual probabilities.
1 Introduction
Last years there was demonstrated increasing interest to foundations of quan-
tum theory.1 I would like to mention a few recent investigations on the gen-
1Intensive development of quantum information theory and quantum computing as well
as new experimental technologies are the main stimulating factors.
1
eral probabilistic structure of quantum theory, L. Ballentine [1], L. Hardy [2],
R. Gill, G. Weihs, A. Zeilinger, M. Zukowski [3], S. Gudder [4], A. Khrennikov
[5], I. Pitowsky [6], J. Summhammer [7] and on the EPR-Bell experiment, L.
Accardi [8], W. De Baere [9], W. De Myunck [10], K. Hess and W. Philipp
[11], A. Khrennikov [12], I. Volovich [13].
Roughly speaking all these investigations are devoted to the problem
formulated in the title of this paper:
“Which element of quantum theory is really the fundamental
“quantum element”?
The Hilbert space representation of states? Born’s rule for probability
and, in particular, interference of probabilities? Noncommutativity of ob-
servables? Heisenberg uncertainty relation? Bohr’s complementarity? Re-
duction? Schro¨dinger evolution? Or we could not at all splitt quantum
theory into essential and nonessential elements? At the moment the latter
point of view dominates in the quantum community: quantum theory as
indivisible whole.2
I think that similar problems stimulated recent investigations of G. ‘t
Hooft [15] who proposed a (discrete) classical deterministic model which be-
neath quantum mechanics. I remark that intereference-like statistical effect
for macroscopic particles (driven by classical electromagnetic forces) was nu-
merically simulated by A. Khrennikov and Ja. Volovich [16] in the model
with discrete time.
Mentioned investigations (besides ‘t Hooft’s model) are devoted to the
probabilistic structure of quantum theory. This is very natural, since quan-
tum theory is a statistical theory. This theory can not say anything about
individual quantum systems (of course, it depends on an interpretation of
quantum mechanics).
Creation of a mathematical theory that would describe dynamics of indi-
vidual quantum systems is the greatest problem for physics of this century or
even millennium.
In the present paper I would like to analyse the structure of quantum
theory by using the so called contextual probabilistic model, see [5]. On the
one hand, by such an analysis we can better understand the probabilistic
structure of quantum theory. On the other hand, by comparing contextual
and quantum models we can try to find the fundamental element of quantum
theory.
2However, see S. Gudder [4] and C. Fuchs [14].
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2 On exotic theories of probability
I would like to start with a rather provocative paper [17] of R. Gill, namely,
with comments on the chapter Khrennikov and exotic probabilities. I totally
disagree with R. Gill in his neglecting of the fundamental role which so called
“exotic probabilistic models”, in particular, CONTEXTUAL probabilistic
models (and, in particular, von Mises frequency model [18]) can play for
clarifying the probabilistic structure of quantum theory.
2.1. “Classical” and “quantum” probabilities. If we consider quan-
tum and classical physics from the purely probabilistic viewpoint then we
should recognize that there exist two very different probabilistic calculi which
are used in completely different situations (moreover, they are developed
practically independently):
1) Kolmogorov measure-theoretical model, 1933, [19].
2). Probabilistic calculus in a Hilbert space, end of 20th (Born, Jordan,
Dirac), e.g., [20].
Remark. It looks very strange (at least for me) that the mathematical for-
malism (Kolmogorov axiomatics) which describes rigorously classical statistical
physics was proposed later than the corresponding quantum formalism...
Since 60th, the main stream of quantum probabilistic investigations was
directed to Bell’s model [21] of the EPR-Bohm experiment [22].3 I think that
Bell’s considerations gave us a new reformulation of the old problem in prob-
abilistic foundations which was already observed in the two slit experiment.
In this experiment the conventional rule for the addition of probabilities is
perturbed by the interference term. Already farthers-creators of quantum
theory paid large attention to this difference in probabilistic calculi, see, e.g.
Dirac [19] or Feynman [27].
We should do something to solve this problem – existence of two different
probability calculi – and to unify these models – Kolmogorov and quantum
– in some way. I think that such a unification should be done on the basis
of some new intuitively clear probabilistic model. We can not start directly
3As pointed out I. Volovich [13] we should sharply distinguish the original EPR model
[23] and the EPR-Bohm-Bell model [21]. Recently we proved [24] that for the original EPR
model it is possible to construct the local realist representation even by using Kolmogorov-
Bell viewpoint to realism, see our further considerations. I also mention investigations of
S. Molotkov [25] and I. Volovich [13], [26] who demonstrated the fundamental role of
space-time in quantum information theory.
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with a Hilbert space. Of course, such a start would be the simplest from
the mathematical viewpoint. However, it induced (and continues to induce)
terrible misunderstandings, mysteries and prejudices.
I should recall that there already were a few attempts of such a unifica-
tion, e.g., models of S. Gudder [28] and I. Pitowsky [29]. And these models
were well done from the mathematical viewpoint! So formally the problem
was solved. The main problem is that those approaches are not intuitively
attractive: e.g., nonmeasurable sets in Pitowsky’s model or so called influ-
ence function in Gudder’s model. Well, the origin of the influence function is
little bit less mysterious than the origin of the Hilbert space. But just little
bit...
The same problem was studied in huge number of works in quantum logic,
see, e.g., [30]. Quantum logic is also well done from the purely mathematical
viewpoint. However, intuitively it is not more attractive than the quantum
Hilbert space formalism.
2.2. Frequency approach. I like the frequency model of R. von Mises,
[18], because this is the most intuitively attractive probabilistic approach. I
would like to remark that the von Mises approach is not at all so bad as it
was claimed in 30th, see, e.g., [31], [32], but here I would not like go into
mathematical and logical details.
For me one of the main distinguishing features of the von Mises approach
is its
CONTEXTUALITY
In this approach a complex of physical conditions (in my papers I propose
the terminology - physical context or simply context) is represented by a
collective. R. von Mises underlined: first a collective then probability.
In the von Mises model contextualism has the following consequences for
the EPR-Bell framework, see [31]:
1) No counterfactual statistical data!
All statistical data are related to concrete collectives (contexts). Here
all considerations based on the use of counterfactual arguments (in partic-
ular, counterfactual derivations of Bell’s inequality, see, e.g., [33], [34]) are
nonsense.4
2) New viewpoint of independence.
4Similar anti-counterfactual conclusions were obtained in some other approaches, e.g.,
W. De Baere [9], W. De Myunck [10], and K. Hess and W. Philipp [11].
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In the frequency model we use a new notion of independence. Not in-
dependence of events (as in the Kolmogorov model and some other models),
but independence of collectives-contexts. R. von Mises strongly criticized
the conventional notion of independence, namely, event independence. He
presented numerous examples in which conventional independence was rep-
resented as just a meaningless game with numbers – to obtain factorization
of probability into the product of probabilities. In the frequency theory we
study independence of collectives (in my terminology – contexts).
If we analyse the well known Bell-Clauser-Horne locality condition by
using independence of collectives then we see immediately, see [31], that cor-
responding collectives are dependent because they contain the same particle-
preparation procedure. Hence there are no reasons to suppose the validity of
this condition or to connect this condition with locality.
3) Existence of probability distributions for hidden variables.
In the von Mises approach we should start with analysing an experimental
situation to be sure that we really have the statistical stabilization (existence
of limits) of relative frequencies. In the opposite to Kolmogorov’s model
we can not start directly with a probability distribution (as Bell did in his
Kolmogorov-version of the EPR-arguments). And here a rather strange, but
important question arise:
Why do we suppose that a Kolmogorov-probability distribution of hidden
variables exists at all?
Well, our experimental equipment produces the statistical stabilization
of relative frequencies for observables. Why should it produce the statisti-
cal stabilization of relative frequencies for hidden variables? I do not see
such reasons... Moreover, intuitively it looks that we can not provide such a
statistical stabilization for microsystems: they are too sensible to our macro-
scopic preparation procedures. In principle, relative frequencies can fluctuate
between 0 and 1.5
The absence of the statistical stabilization of relative frequencies for mi-
5When we say “fluctuate” we have in mind “in the real topology.” So we should re-
member that all our probabilistic models, e.g., Kolmogorov and von Mises, are rigidly
coupled to one very special topology, namely, the real one. Where is the origin of the
real topological probability? In the real topology of space-time? Do all our probabilistic
models describe just the reality of the real space-time? I discussed these problems at
many occasions, see, e.g., [31], [35]. In particular, I developed a p-adic probability model
in which reality (p-adic reality) is associated with p-adic collectives-contexts, i.e., “random
sequences” for which relative frequencies stabilize in the p-adic topology, [31], [35].
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croparameters does not at all contradict to the statistical stabilization of
relative frequencies for macro-observables, see examples in [31].
In principle, chaotic fluctuations in the microworld may generate statis-
tical stability on the macrolevel!
Neither it contradicts to realism. But we should distinguish INDIVID-
UAL REALISM (physical observables are objective properties of physical
systems, i.e., mathematically we can represent them as functions of HV,
a = a(λ)) and KOLMOGOROV-BELL REALISM, namely, the existence of
the probability distribution.
Thus von Mises approach strongly differs from Kolmogorov’s approach.
I disagree with R. Gill who claimed that these approaches give the same
consequences: ”Regarding to Kolmogorov and von Mises... I do not see any
opposition between alternative views of probability here,” [16].
2.3. Contextual probability. The frequency approach is really a
contextual probabilistic approach. Here we work not with just one fixed
collective-context, but with a few collective-contexts by combining probabil-
ities belonging to different collectives-contexts. Of course, R. von Mises did
not do so much in this direction. But in any case it was the important step
compare with the Kolmogorov approach. Of course, Kolmogorov also paid at-
tention on contextuality of probabilities, see [19], [36]. But his ideology was:
for any fixed physical context we should choose a fixed Kolmogorov probabil-
ity space and work in this space for ever! Even Kolmogorov-conditioning is
just event-conditioning in one fixed Kolmogorov probability space – so for a
fixed context. R. Gill and I. Helland paid my attention to the fact that statis-
ticians often consider families of Kolmogorov probability spaces depending
on some parameter σ. Then by using statistics for random variables they try
to find this parameter. However, it is totally different ideology. I think that
the main role contextualism of probabilities play when we move from one
context to another. In really contextual probability theory we should be able
to work not only in one fixed context, but also to describe transformations
of probabilities which are induced by context transitions. Such a contextual-
ism can be called Transition Contextualism and traditional Kolmogorov (and
statistical) contextualism – Stationary Contextualism.6
6There are some probabilistic approaches which are based on conditional probabili-
ties, see, e.g., Renyi [37] or Cox [38]. However, those approaches are still rigidly coupled
to Stationary Contextualism. Therefore I disagree with L. Ballentine [1] who claimed
that quantum probability can be reduced to such a conditional probability – he used the
Cox-model. On the other hand, I appreciate Ballentine’s investigations on conditional
6
I think that one of the main distinguishing features of the quantum prob-
abilistic formalism is the possibility to find dependence of probabilities on
contexts. By changing a representation (the orthonormal basis) in a Hilbert
space we change context. And the quantum formalism gives us the trans-
formation of probabilities induced by such a context change. Thus quantum
probabilistic formalism is a transition-contextual formalism.
At the moment we do not have an intuitively clear transition-contextual
probability theory. Therefore I tried to proceed in the von Mises approach. I
do not claim that this is the final contextual probabilistic theory. But even by
using the von Mises model I could do a lot to clarify the probabilistic struc-
ture of quantum theory. As we have already seen, there are at least three
contextual arguments against conclusions which J. Bell did on the basis of his
Kolmogorov model for the EPR-Bohm experiment: no counterfactual data,
no independence of collectives (so the absence of the Bell-Clauser-Horne lo-
cality condition), the absence of physical argument supporting Kolmogorov-
Bell realism. Moreover, in the frequency model, instead of Bell’s (or CHSH)
inequality, we obtain some modifications of this inequality, see [40]. In gen-
eral these modified inequalities do not contradict to experiments. Moreover,
recently I derived the quantum EPR-Bohm correlations in the frequency ap-
proach (without to appeal to the Hilbert space formalism), see [41].7
2.4. Quantum≡contextual? My contextual probabilistic investiga-
tions demonstrated that many things which are traditionally assigned to
the quantum domain can be reproduced by using a contextual probabilis-
tic model. In particular, the interference of probabilities which is typically
considered as one of the fundamental features of quantum systems can be
obtained in a contextual model, see [43] on the frequency derivation of the
interference.
The following question is of the great interest for me:
probabilistic viewpoint of quantum probability. It was the first step – Stationary Contex-
tualism – in the direction of quantum contextualism. I also remark that even earlier L.
Accardi provided a detailed analysis of the role of Bayes formula for conditional probability
in understanding of quantum probability [39].
7Of course, if we are discussing just the Kolmogorov-Bell realism, then all our frequency
(contextual) arguments are meaningless. But it seems not to be the case! It seems that
when we discuss realism we have in mind INDIVIDUAL REALISM. Such a realism can be
described very well by the frequency probability model. I also remark that by using the
frequency (contextual) model we can easily resolve the GHZ-paradox, see [42]. Of course,
we assume that GHZ were interested to discuss realism and not just the Kolmogorov-Bell
realism.
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Can “quantum” be totally reduced to “contextual”? Or “quantum” is
something more special than “contextual”?
To investigate this question in more detail I considered a formal contex-
tual probability model [5]. I did not try to provide a mathematical description
of a context (if it is possible at all in the general case). In such a formal model
contexts are just some labels which are assigned to probabilities, P = PS .
This is most general framework based on the well acceptable postulate:
All probabilities depend on contexts – complexes of experimental physical
conditions.
We can generalize von Mises slogan by saying: first context then probabil-
ity. In this framework we can reproduce, e.g., the interference of probabilities.
However, we immediately see that the formal contextual probability model
describes essentially larger set of context transitions than quantum theory.
In particular, I found that, besides the trigonometric (“quantum”) interfer-
ence, there can appear the hyperbolic interference. The latter transformation
of probabilities also has a linear representation, namely, in a module over a
Clifford algebra [44].
“Theorem”. Quantum domain is just a proper subset of contextual do-
main.
The fundamental question (at least for me) is : Which additional elements
should we add to “contextual” to obtain really “quantum”?
Recently in the process of our discussions with I. Volovich we understood
that space-time does not present in the conventional axiomatics of quan-
tum mechanics, see, e.g., von Neumann [45]. On the basis of our discussion
I. Volovich presented a new system of axioms for quantum mechanics, see
[46]. Roughly speaking this is von Neumann’s axiomatics with the additional
space-time axiom. However, in the process of further discussions we under-
stood that space-time is nothing than a special context – space-time context,
see our quant-preprint [47]. According to the general ideology of the contex-
tual approach probabilities should also depend on the space-time context. I
do not think that space-time as itself is the “fundamental quantum element.”
The same space-time we also use in classical mechanics.
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3 “Fundamental quantum element”
The contextual probabilistic investigations demonstrated that a rather spe-
cial behaviour of quantum probabilities is, in fact, nothing than contextual
behaviour. Thus the Hilbert space calculus of probabilities is not the “fun-
damental quantum element”. The fundamental is the very special form of
time-evolution of probability distributions, namely, Schro¨dinger evolution. I
do not afraid to say that the real quantum mechanics was discovered by E.
Shro¨dinger [48] and not by W. Heisenberg [49]. In particular, I do not con-
sider noncommutativity as a fundamental really quantum feature. The non-
commutative representation of physical observables in conventional quantum
theory is just a sign of contextuality. In principle, such a representation can
arise in various classical physical models. Such examples were presented in
our paper with S. Kozyrev [50]. I think that there can be found hundreds
of noncommutative classical models. In particular, Heisenberg’s uncertainty
relations are just contextual statistical relations describing dependence of
dispersions on physical contexts. From this point of view quantum logic is,
in fact, not quantum, but a contextual logic.
The main quantum mystery is
MYSTERY of SCHRO¨DINGER REPRESENTATION.
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